elements within the deployed 4 th BCT-101 st Airborne division. Sources and back-ground from here at the USAWC include members from the Peace-Keeping and Stability
Operations Institute (PKSOI), class readings during the previous six months, as well as periodicals, books, and After Action Reviews from both military and civilian subjectmatter experts in the areas of counter-insurgency and its "best practices." The evolution of what the role of the Department of Defense should be in "nation building" provided some back-ground. The military personnel in our combat team knew that the military was not necessarily the "best" element in terms of the required skill sets for nationbuilding, but had the capacity to support the team effort. We were constantly reminded that "Afghanistan is not Iraq", and that our mission would be more of "construction", than "reconstruction." PRTs. We included our future PRT commanders (undergoing training at Fort Bragg, NC) in our pre-deployment training in order to aid in development of the trust and confidence necessary to fight and win over a significant amount of battle space. Each of our battalion and PRT commanders would operate in separate provinces that could be hours away from the brigade headquarters by air, and possibly days by ground. Given this distance and the limitations of radio instructions it was considered important to have our primary leadership know each other personally. Our Brigade commander crafted a series of training events to bring the commanders and staff together with the goal of increasing our efficiency and understanding of each other as preparation for the distances we would face in the future. I was sent along with our unit commandsergeants majors to visit the DCO of the 3/10 th and gain an appreciation of the challenges faced by the PRT commanders then serving in theater. Visits to PRT Mether-Lam, PRT Ghazni, and PRT Khowst were conducted, as well as attending both the PRT conference in Kabul and a Campaign Objectives Assessment Brief (COAB) in
Bagram, along with detailed pre-briefs by the current TF Spartan (3/10 BCT, 10 th Mountain Division), USAID representative, BCT Civil Military Officer, and Department of State representative or Political Affairs Advisor. I unfortunately was able to see the impact of the assassination of one of the provincial governors on the PRT effort in the area, and perhaps more importantly, how the current unit addressed the threat. The unit was able to rapidly obligate funds to provide each of the Afghan Provincial Governors in RC-East with two armored civilian sports utility vehicles that would enable the Governor to conduct his business in a non-US military vehicle, but with the appropriate force protection requirements needed for perceived post-assassination threats. 3 This reconnaissance saved a significant amount of time in understanding the basics of the incredibly complex battlefield in RC-E. Our unit was immediately struck by the critical importance of the PRTs in providing the Afghan people the ability to choose whether to support their own government, or the Taliban/Al-Qaeda insurgents. Our "non lethal"
bullets were the immense deep funding pockets of our USAID partners, and the rapid, "non-lethal dollars" provided by the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP). 4 Another area that quickly gained our attention was the criticality of time in the counter-insurgency fight. It took time to build the personal relationships and trust required with our Afghan hosts both on the civilian and military side, this "three cups of tea" time became something that both our maneuver and PRT commanders quickly learned was a key to success.
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During our Brigade rotation in theater, we went through three changes of U.S.
PRT leadership. In each cycle, three U.S. Navy Commanders and one U.S. Air Force Lieutenant-Colonel led a joint, combined, and inter-agency team of approximately 82 personnel each. The 3/10 th BCT moved to Jalalabad for three months in an extended tour as US forces doubled in RC-East and eventually was replaced by the 173 rd Airborne Brigade from Vicenza Italy. Our BCT environment in RC-E was much less than permissive; despite the PRT focus on creating capacity within Afghanistan for the betterment of the citizens, hostility and open combat were daily events that challenged the entire BCT/PRT team. Casualties occurred in the combined team during the deployment, but never undermined the quality of the PRT effort.
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Approximately six months into our rotation we gained "handcon" 7 of the Turkish PRT in Wardak province. This was our single PRT that was not directly partnered with a maneuver element. Our Brigade Special Troops Battalion (BSTB) and 2/508 th Parachute Infantry Regiment provided the Turkish PRT with regular liaison and served as an additional element able to respond to security threats if required. Approximately eleven months into our rotation our BCT aided the introduction and partnership with the Czech PRT newly arriving in country by both the exchange of information over the phone and by sending subject-matter experts to participate in the Czech predeployment planning and training. Our BSTB engineers and contracting personnel built the complete base for the PRT and established the critical maneuver battalion partnership. By the time our rotation ended, the Czech PRT was fully capable in country, albeit with a structure very different from a U.S. PRT. The Czech PRT had over 200 personnel, its own wheeled as well as tracked Infantry Fighting Vehicles, its own intelligence support, as well as a robust national civilian element. 8 During our deployment; the PRTs and attached maneuver battalions of the 4 th BCT obligated over $156 million in aid projects. Additionally, projects to promote good governance, rule of law, agricultural improvements, and literacy further increased the ability of the Afghan government to both connect with and provide needed services to their citizens.
Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq differ, depending on the country providing them and on the environment in which they operate.
In "non-U.S." -led regions of Afghanistan, PRTs often reported directly to the ISAF headquarters. In our "U.S." RC-E, the PRTs reported to the US Brigade
Commander who was the "battle space owner", or the military officer who was responsible for the command and control of all military forces in the area. In military operations this ensures that the commander understands where the friendly and enemy forces are located and how to ensure that the assets needed to accomplish the assigned mission are applied effectively. The PRTs were considered another element on the field that were key to the COIN fight for the Brigade and larger mission .
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Regional Command-East encompassed significantly restive provinces, the majority of which directly touch the tribal mountainous areas of the Pakistan-Afghan border. Our
PRTs could not operate freely without an adequate security bubble, either provided organically or by partnered-maneuver battalion. Governors in RC-E were often targets for assassination; at least five bombing attempts were made against Governor Jamal of Khowst during our tenure together. In contrast, the German PRT to our North was much larger in size, operated in truly permissive areas, and were much heavier in terms of civilian expertise.
Each rotation of both PRT and maneuver brigade should improve in its ability to serve the people of Afghanistan in terms of effectiveness of the "non-kinetic" aspects of the counter-insurgency fight. Unfortunately the effectiveness of the individual unit appears to improve only after months on the ground despite efforts to conduct comprehensive training and an exchange of information between units. Although critics have often described the U.S. effort as a series of one-year engagements vs. an eightyear fight; continuity and lessons-learned continue to improve. I personally believe that now that the OEF and OIF effort has continued for years, our military and civilian professionals are truly treating this as a marathon effort instead of a military "sprint."
OEF early rotations (to include ones that many of our unit officer's and noncommissioned officers participated in)fought only the barest of non-kinetic portions of the COIN due to the lack of PRTs and the economy of force in terms of funding and manpower for this huge country. Our war-college class has studied counter-insurgency history during this academic year. We have learned that focusing only on the kinetic approach has never proven completely successful. ADM. Eric Olson stated, "The indirect approach requires more time than the direct approach to achieve effects, but ultimately will be the decisive effort."
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Leadership within the U.S. PRTs varied immensely between our three rotations;
fortunately the quality of the senior officers assigned to the posts quickly addressed the challenges posed by the mission, enemy, and terrain. The Navy, in particular, sent its best officers to support the COIN fight; both CDR John "Duke" Wade and CDR Dave Adams worked directly for the Chief of Naval Operations when they were detailed personally to lead PRTs. 11 We had nuclear submarine commanders, Navy Blue Angel and often other government agency personnel on complex, multi faceted missions. This mission was compounded in complexity by the criticality of developing a close relationship with the provincial governor and his staff, the local Afghan National Army and National Police leadership as well as myriad non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Each small PRT worked complicated engineering projects costing millions of dollars, and all were subject to both U.S. and coalition Quality Assurance/Quality
Control-with considerable U.S. fiscal oversight. This all provided a credible challenge to a talented group. We at the Brigade (and specifically at the PRT) were challenged to ensure that the appropriate funds were used for each project or part thereof. Title 10 and Title 22 funding had separate requirements while CERP and USAID had specific limitations. In an example, to build a district center, or medical clinic one had to ensure the appropriate funds were used to build the physical structure of the building and install plumbing, and electrical systems as applicable; but also that any required observation towers or walls were included in the end product. I soon realized that nothing gets built successfully in Afghanistan if it does not have a wall to shield it from prying eyes, and towers to enable its occupants to defend themselves from thieves, rival tribes, or the Taliban.
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The PRT itself provides an example of how a military/governmental organization can serve as a tactical enabler of the Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic (DIME) elements of National power. In the following sections I will briefly provide examples of how this enabling function worked in RC-E during OEF VIII.
Diplomatic. Each PRT had a Department of State (DOS) representative who
was to work in collaboration/unity of effort with the PRT and USAID representative. I state "unity of effort" since the PRT commander did not enjoy true "command" over either USAID or Department of State representatives. "HandCon" 14 was developed and matured as all three legs of the triad built trust and confidence in the abilities and capacity of each other. Our DOS representatives varied in age and experience; but all worked diligently to build Afghan capacity. The expertise provided by the DOS representative helped the commander's understand the intricacies of the Afghan central government and the processes required for our provincial governors to work within the Afghan system. Our DOS personnel additionally provided a window into what the current U.S. national and international diplomatic efforts were impacting on Afghanistan.
The diplomatic challenges for each PRT varied also due to the quality of the provincial governor of each particular area. The relationship of the provincial governor to senior Afghan governmental officials and President Karzai was critical. Tribal power issues helped shape both the timing and appointment of provincial governors as well as their effectiveness. A truly effective governor had to be able to work the complex dynamics of the Afghan government in Kabul as well as the intricacies of politics in a province where he personally may be considered a semi-foreigner. In one of our provinces, the young provincial governor was incredibly effective at building consensus among his various, older tribal leaders due to his continued demonstration of honesty and ability to provide goods and services to his constituents. 15 In another province, the The PRT worked to help provide the Afghan government story to both an internal and external audience. Each PRT had a small number of contractor provided interpreters of various degrees of quality and language proficiency. Each PRT additionally had locally contracted interpreters, or "terps" of various levels of capability and vetting. Towards the mid-point of our rotation, guidance was provided that dictated that only a certain company could provide "interpreters" to the coalition effort. This rapidly threatened to unemploy the best and most effective local "terps," many who had passed polygraph checks and who had worked for the coalition for years. We were able, however to keep select locals in a billet as "Afghan Cultural Advisors" or ACAs. ACAs provided another window to the Afghan culture as well as aiding in the effort to address true local needs, versus what Americans and coalition troops "perceived" the needs to be. The addition of Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) to our BCT gave us professional cultural anthropologists who could and did work closely with the PRTs to provide another "cultural lens" into our various tribal entities which greatly improved the efficacy of our combined/joint effort. 17 These HTTs had to perform their work in the challenging security environment of Afghanistan while partnered with US forces, but also were often challenged in the press by fellow scholars. The HTT program itself was attacked by elements within the academic community despite the initial success of the field teams.
"Mercenary Anthropologists" was a title that appeared in the press during our rotation to Afghanistan, earning a series of supporting letters from our staff in defense of the HTT efforts. 18 The informational effort was also greatly assisted by the growth and capacity of As stated in the Diplomatic section-the visits to our PRTs were fully supported in order to make the disruption of the PRT normal mission something of value to both the PRT and to the overall fight. The PRT had so much "good news" to show in terms of Afghan development that it was a key factor in our successful information campaign.
Military.
Although the PRT was a major tool in creating positive effects for the Afghan people, it was and remains a powerful tool for the counter insurgency fight. We did not "clear and hold" with a maneuver unit, and then later "build" with the PRT. All three tasks were done as close to simultaneously as possible in an effort that greatly show up, we win," was a quote from our first combined operation.
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The Taliban/AlQueda could not provide any competition to this combined effort other than terror and death. 20 The single best example of this PRT/maneuver battalion partnership was in the province of Khowst. Two PRT commanders in turn partnered in a phenomenally effective manner with the maneuver battalion commander to support what was likely the best governor in RC-E. Over fifteen months, this province, once the "suicide bomber capital" of Afghanistan, became one of the most secure and prosperous provinces in the entire country. Once the Afghan citizen could safely choose to back the government, he did so.
The efforts of the Special Forces ("White SOF") in our area of operations were critical. These quiet professionals consistently demonstrated the ability and dedication to aid the Afghan effort both kinetically and non kinetically. When our operations were coordinated and complementary with theirs, the SOF Soldiers helped produce powerful combined effects.
Our Brigade Combat Team owned the battle space in which the battalions, the PRTs, and even the Special Forces teams operated, and our proficiency in working all elements together grew over the course of the rotation. 21 By combining our efforts, the PRTs were able to act as a rapid conduit to the provincial governor during operations involving "non BCT" forces operating in our battle-space. When special operations forces conducted raids on high value targets, the PRT commander would call his provincial governor immediately upon execution of the mission, explaining what had occurred and more importantly the reason why. This sounds simple, but it was not as carefully synchronized during earlier OEF rotations. We found that when a Governor was brought to the village where such a raid was conducted, he was often able to provide the background to the villagers and the evidence for why such action had been taken with his approval between the ANA and ANP over accusations of theft by the police. Significant progress was made, but this will continue to take a multi-year effort to achieve.
Another project that was "led" by the Military component of both our BCT and
PRTs consisted of efforts to improve the Rule of Law (ROL) in our portion of RC-E.
During our pre-deployment site surveys and training, the topic of Rule of Law had been raised, but was discussed as something that Department of State representatives in Kabul, along with Italian elements were working on. In our portion of RC-E, there was almost zero visible progress in this area. Our PRTs discussed RoL with their respective governors, each of whom had their own views on the topic. The Italians had barely touched the surface on the topic, and only in Kabul. In the provinces we saw mixed examples of tribal law, mainly influenced by the traditional Pashtunwali codes of behavior in the Pashtun areas, and/or Sharia (Islamic) law in others. There was no visible education for local lawmakers, and no agreed upon norms of behavior in addressing criminal activity, or in terms of enemy or terrorist personnel. The ANP could arrest people, but there was no true RoL to have crimes investigated, prosecuted, and a judgment pronounced. Our PRTs conducted research into RoL in their respective provinces, and our unit lawyer put together a program in coordination with our Divisional JAG as well as USAID to conduct training in the RoL. At both BCT and the PRTs, a training program was put together and executed in both Gardez and Khowst provinces.
Funding, including from USAID, enabled gatherings of provincial and district lawyers to be quartered, fed, and educated; at the end of which each lawmaker was given a complete set of legal texts in the local language. We were also able to select and fund an Afghan lawyer who served in our Brigade legal office, greatly improving our ability to support RoL training and capacity building.
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Economic. Despite pledges of millions of dollars in international aid to
Afghanistan there is not significant government capacity to bring goods and services to the people outside of Kabul. This is not necessarily an indictment of the Afghan government; 35-plus years of war removed much of the intellectual, economic, and structural capital of the country, while empowering local actors. There were few if any structures left in country to be able to spend money in an effective manner that would be felt by the people. Often Afghans would tell us that they had seen and heard promises of millions and millions of dollars to Afghanistan, but that such promises were either lies, or the money was stolen in Kabul. Historically, the only thing that came from the capital city was the occasional tax collector (or worse). I heard this from both The combined/joint/inter-agency power of the PRT was the ability to actually leverage funds to the betterment of the Afghan people, not just provide promises that may or may not be fulfilled. Our commander called CERP dollars "non lethal bullets" in our COIN strategy, and it worked. Military and civilian expertise for finance, engineering, and so forth was resident on site for project development in close cooperation with the local Afghan government.
Our PRT military members could readily access the CERP funds, and actually deliver projects and funding on time to the people. Resident PRT expertise in how to craft contracts rapidly and to conduct quality assurance/quality control brought immediate effects, which were far better than promises for a distant future. In a counterinsurgency fight; time is critical. During our rotation the phrase, "the Americans have the watches, but the Taliban has the time" was often heard. 29 Long term projects were of great value, but the COIN fight required speed in terms of bringing effects to the people to separate them from the enemy. 30 USAID expertise brought the immensely deep pockets of funds in support of the longer term fight. USAID money as larger "non lethal bullets" aimed by the PRT collaborative team enabled not only huge, long term road projects, but also smaller scale, rapidly turned governmental training programs, medical training programs, and education of governmental officials and lawyers on the Rule of Law. Occasionally (and humorously only at higher level meetings) there appeared to be friction between the DOD, the NGOs, DoS, and USAID on who "got" which projects.
Over time, and mainly through the PRTs, all of these agencies and departments worked for relatively combined effects enabling the Afghans to choose their Government vs. the alternate vision and the long term, sustainable projects that would enable Afghanistan to stand on its own. 31 Our commander consistently said "anything is possible as long as you don't care who gets the credit." 32 These powerful words came to fruition through the PRTs.
In terms of BCT support to the efforts of the PRTs a significant amount of energy was devoted to the assistance of development, contracting, screening, and funding of the myriad CERP funded projects within RC-E.
CERP money was not "free" in terms of a haphazard gifting of funds to our Afghan allies. Professional dedication, legal restrictions, and stewardship of our taxpayers' funds ensured that each approved project involving U.S. monies was fully Afghanistan has plenty of water but very little effective water management after decades of war and neglect. The old but effective "Karez" system of underground water management requires both cleaning and rebuilding in order to harness the available water for irrigation. Great effort across the BCT was made to develop a comprehensive plan that would enable small business to flourish with foodstuffs produced on a much larger scale, products brought to a market illuminated by low cost solar lighting, served by decent roadways that prevented damage to the produce, and the ability to export these products to other villages and cities and also to neighboring Pakistan. Such a vision, shared by both our Afghan allies, and the dedicated experts of the PRTs and staff helped in the goal of convincing the local population that the future lay with their own government. The PRTs in both the informational and economic elements of power supported bringing construction and improvement to the provinces, positive elements to compete with the Taliban threats of violence.
Over time, our projects were much less focused on our providing a particular building for example, than to ensuring that all projects actually improved the capacity of to ISAF headquarters and their own national command elements. Often various governmental and non-governmental agencies sought to go directly to the PRTs for questions, visits, guidance, tasking and the like. The average US PRT commander was meeting several times a week at a minimum with his Afghan governor, was on the road visiting Afghan district/local leadership, was conducting quality assurance/quality assistance visits to multi-million dollar projects, was answering to our own Brigade commander, and was also fighting against insurgents determined to thwart his efforts and kill his personnel. He also had daily coordination and meetings with his partnered US maneuver battalion and nightly/daily coordination meetings with his own PRT team leadership.
The US brigade command acted as the "gatekeeper" in many ways for the PRT commander's time. It is no exaggeration to say that many times, even daily, our PRT commanders would refer both national and international requests for their time to me for deflection; there would be no way for a PRT commander to be able to accomplish any of their "true" missions if they entertained all outside requests on their time. Coalition leadership at all levels during our rotation to coordinate the effort for a common good. PRTs consistently had to pay attention to the various pots of money that could be used for different types of projects. The Brigade and Divisional legal team assisted in this effort. Our Brigade ran a very comprehensive "CERP school" and primer for both the PRTs and maneuver battalions that would manage CERP projects. This was exported to our sister Brigade as well as to the Divisional headquarters.
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Unfortunately for our PRTs, on rare occasions the best projects were delayed until the appropriate pressure could be brought to bear. As an example, one PRT road project included a vehicle turn off, embedded vehicular weight scale, and government building in order to enable the Afghan government to actually weigh cross border trucks and cars. This project would support checking traffic and enable the application of a reasonable tariff that would provide legitimate revenue for the Afghan national and local government to self-maintain the roadway. The scale was not funded as the division staff decision was that the Afghans needed to "figure out their own system in their own time." 36 I'm still confused at this decision, as I thought that the overall project was a wellthought out, forward-thinking proposal to further develop Afghan capacity for selfsustainment.
Recommendations for "Future" PRTs The Afghan Engineering District (AED) needs to continue to be manned and funded to support the long term development goals for a stable and prosperous Afghanistan.
I believe the Afghans want peace. I believe that they want their family structure to remain intact. They support education of their children within their own value system.
They want to be able to sell and buy their products safely and locally. They want their own government to be able to provide for them, and they want to see their own elected officials. If foreigners can help with the mentorship, structure, and support of their security infrastructure, if we can help Afghan companies stand up, to build their own
roads, to open their own businesses-the Taliban and Al-Queda will likely be beaten.
The Afghans know that they beat the Soviets. They remember that we as the US helped them during the time of the Soviet occupation. Standing with them now, and not "redefining" success or abandoning them again is critical to the establishment of a secure, functional, democratic Afghanistan. We need a functional Afghanistan; the "failed state"
supported the original Al-Qaeda threat from 9-11 and their associated Taliban hosts. As early as 2001, Dr. Larry Goodson wrote of the reasons why Afghanistan's failure could pose a threat to the United States. 40 We need a stable Afghanistan to the east of fundamentalist Iran. We need a stable Afghanistan to the west of embattled Pakistan.
We need a stable and functional Afghanistan that can shift its economic foundation from international aid and opium production to one that is able to provide its own wheat, flour, meat, pomegranates, and natural resources to its own population and others both regional and worldwide.
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Cultural training for PRT commanders and staffs continues to improve. As stated earlier, a multi-service, mixed civilian-governmental, mixed gender organization needs to be prepared not only for a foreign culture in Afghanistan, but also for the cultural change of working in what rapidly becomes a combat environment. Often the language was not delicate, whether in person or over the radio. Standards of personal and unit discipline, property accountability, field sanitation, unit morale, and combat awareness were critical; challenging in any good unit, and certainly so in a rainbow coalition of a combined/joint/interagency unit. Time pressure for actions was significant. The demand for results was consistent in our BCT, and the price for failure was high. Each of our PRTs suffered casualties in the field as a reminder of the danger present in the effort to transform Afghanistan. One PRT suffered the injury of personnel during the last week in country a suicide bombing against the Provincial Governor at the opening of a medical clinic-an incredible experience for a small, joint, and combined team. As a "joint vignette," I listened to two PRT commanders (one a Naval aviator, one an Air force officer) discussing the shifting of an 81mm mortar in support of two of their projects.
One turned to me and laughed, saying "hey man, I never, ever thought that I'd be talking about mortar support to my ground maneuver…I'm a Naval Aviator man!"
The topic of gender in Afghan culture is often a heated one. U.S. and Afghan culture differ on the roles of women both within and outside the home. From my view, assigning a female officer to serve as a PRT commander is not a wise move. Iraqi and some other Arab cultures are in my opinion, much more "western" than traditional Afghan tribal culture. The female PRT commander is challenged immediately because as a female, there are traditional and deeply felt cultural roles and responsibilities between males and females, despite their being from different countries. Our governors, male Afghans from different tribal affiliations, even some with Western education, could not easily bring a female into a "shura" or meeting, even though she was a serving officer. It is unfortunate, but in this particular country I do not believe that it is wise for either the mission or for the serving officer to be placed in the position of PRT commander, at least in the provinces within Regional Command-East. During our BCT time in theater, we had two talented female officers serve as PRT commanders, but neither could achieve the desired effects primarily due to the cultural attitudes of the Afghan people. Retired Department of State Officer Michael Metrinko crafted a guidebook for U.S. advisors serving in countries with Muslim societies where he offered his expertise gained over decades serving abroad, stating, "The female advisor may be able to overcome these cultural inhibitions against her success by forces of personality and professional competence, but it will be a difficult uphill battle, consuming inordinate time and energy and possibly detracting from the advisory mission." 
Endnotes
The ensemble of approaches summarized under the term "nation-building," for all their slowness and difficulty, must be vital parts of any strategy to blunt radical Islamism's appeal. Second, while nation-building will not always require the comprehensive reconstruction of the polity, economy, and physical infrastructure of a bludgeoned land, it does require all these things in Afghanistan, and so a sustained international effort under U.S. leadership is indispensable." Larry Goodson, "Afghanistan's Road to Reconstruction" Journal of Democracy 14, no. 1 (January 2003):97-98.
Special Troops Battalion (BSTB) who had been both fighting and building in this region for the previous year, utilizing the commanders CERP funds as a non-lethal weapon.
9 "Many experts believed that unity of command was vital to success in counterinsurgencies. One model was the CORDS (Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support) program in Vietnam, which combined military and civilians in the same chain of command…The new provincial reconstruction teams in Baghdad were also embedded at each brigade headquarters, where they reported to the brigade commander." Robinson, Tell Me How This Ends, General David Petraeus and the search for a way out of Iraq, 116.
10 "The indirect approach addresses the underlying causes of terrorism and the environments in which terrorism activities occur. The indirect approach requires more time than the direct approach to achieve effects, but ultimately will be the decisive effort." Admiral Eric T. 11 Both CDR Wade and CDR Adams had served directly in the office of the CNO. Both of these talented officers said that they were told directly by the CNO that they were taking command of PRTs due to their leadership abilities, and would be assigned command of warships upon completion of the mission. Both of these superb officers are serving today.
12 Each military service trains its officers in leadership, whether on land, sea, or air. Military services require many junior officers but less numbers at the higher ranks. A competitive selection process for promotion and for command is present in each service. Some may argue, but the military, in my personal and professional opinion is one of the few meritocracies in America. Only a very small number of Naval officers meet the selection criteria to be given command of a surface or submarine vessel; only a handful of highly trained Naval aviators are afforded the opportunity to fly in the precision team of the Blue Angels. Talent can be described in many ways-specifically in regards to the PRTs however, the extremely technical talents required to command a nuclear submarine may not immediately result in a leader who can bring together a combined/inter-agency team in combat.
13 Early in our rotation there was discussion "tongue in cheek" of constructing a series of "defensible veterinary clinics" throughout our A/O. We eventually gained the skill set to fund and contract building projects to ensure both the physical safety of the structure from the elements, but also to the fairly unique cultural and security requirements of the Afghan countryside. You don't want to build a school for women that has no wall to protect the students and teachers from unwanted eyes.
14 Zinni, Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) film, see citation 4.
15 During our rotation we discovered that the popular statement that corruption was "just part of Afghan culture" and that the Afghan's didn't care about corruption were both incorrect. Discussions directly with provincial governors, district governors, Afghan military commanders, and local villagers all indicated that any "corruption" either perceived or proven, were unacceptable to Afghans. Human Terrain Teams broadened the scope of our Western view of Afghan "culture" in this regard. Theft, whether taking a cell phone from a villager, or diverting aid money and contracts, was a constant source of discussion and anger among locals in RC-E. Both afghan and western coalition elements constantly scrutinized governmental officials for wrong-doing both real and perceived. I do agree however, that there are definite differences in the "culture" of what behavior can be tolerated or accepted in political leaders between Afghanistan and the U.S. Our own political leaders in U.S. history, from Huey Long, to Marion Berry show that sometimes personal behavior and character mean less to some constituents than the ability to deliver the desired product. 16 This cross border meeting had been scheduled due to the increase in small conflicts between tribal elements on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border. The U.S. contingent included our BCT DoS representative, a superbly qualified and professional lifelong Foreign Service officer, as well as the Afghan governor, Brigade Special Troops Battalion (BSTB) commander, BSTB Operations officer, and a handful of U.S. personnel. Immediately following the meeting and concluding photo opportunities, personnel dressed in Pakistani Frontier Corps uniform engaged our team in a near ambush, killing one U.S. officer. U.S. forces returned fire, killing the initial assailant and likely several others. The U.S. and Afghan personnel made it to the extraction pickup-zone under pressure and were brought back to FOB Salerno. This was a particularly hard day for our combined and inter-agency team; the fallen Soldier was immensely popular in our unit and a superbly talented professional.
17 "The overall focus of a human terrain team is to use socio-cultural research and knowledge of the population to advise and make recommendations to the brigade during planning and operations that positively affect both the population and the military unit, preventing violence before it starts, or decreasing it after inception." Captain Nathan 20 COL Marty Schweitzer emphasized that the combined efforts of the Afghan security elements, coalition military efforts, and the improvement in the range of Afghan governmental capacity to provide for its citizens were the key-the Afghan government (with its allies) could "build" things for the Afghan citizens, the only thing that the Taliban/Al Queda could do was destroy things. Our goal was to convince the populace that their own government could provide positive things for them while the opposite vision of the Taliban only brought terror. "Eventual victory results in large measure from convincing a solid majority of members of the population that their lives will be better under the government than under an insurgent regime."Conrad C. Crane, "Minting COIN, Principles and Imperatives for Combating Insurgency," Air & Space Power Journal, December 01 2007, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj07/win07/crane.html (accessed January 21, 2009). 21 Our 3 rd SFG A-team commander, Darrin Blatt wrote the following in regards to our combined effort: "The Cav unit was the battle space "owner," so it was extremely important to meet with them and share operational philosophies….Understanding the need for unity of effort is the first step to success in the counterinsurgency, or COIN environment" "In eastern Paktya, the population's ethical decisions are not governed by a rigid moral compass based on moral imperatives. Ethics are based on self-interest and on self-preservation. Using one's position to better one's family, clan, village, or tribe is expected" MAJ Darin J. Blatt et al., "Tribal Engagement in Afghanistan" Special Warfare 22, no. 1 (January-February 2009) 20. 22 The burden of "proof" was interesting in regards to the removal of "negative actors" during such raids. The provincial governors had to be able to satisfy their constituents that actions taken had occurred for a valid reason, and that either reparations would be paid, damages to property addressed, and that per custom either visits to personnel in custody were arranged, or the person released on the guarantee of the local/tribal leader. The burden of legal proof will continue to be an issue as Afghan rule of law improves. What defines a criminal, enemy, or even a "negative influencer" is a challenge to both the Afghan government and Western military forces. One Afghan security force leader was removed by coalition and Afghan forces after an extensive and detailed (98 page) investigative briefing was prepared. Pictures of hundreds of rifles, machine-guns, rocket-propelled grenade launchers seized from his personal quarters were attached, as well as evidence of significant wrong-doing in every conceivable manner. Despite the compelling evidence, this detention proved challenging as tribal politics included sending a large element of protestors to Kabul. The maturing of Afghan governmental effectiveness, as well as that of its security forces should eventually remove some of this burden from coalition forces. 23 It sounds incredible, but such MTTS had previously operated freely throughout the battle space without the knowledge of either PRT or BCT commanders or staff. There was a parallel structure in place, with CSTC-A officially training and mentoring the ANA, but without any coordination or command and control linkages with the 82d or 101 st Divisional staff in Bagram; and certainly without any C2 arrangement with the BCT commanders/battle space owners. At its best; without any arrangement with the BCT would result in a lack of timely U.S. ability to aid an MTT in contact with fires, quick reaction force, or MEDEVAC. At its worst, such teams could suffer fratricide. The decision to have MTTs "OPCON" to the BCT battle space owner during operations was the best command and control decision for the BCT, the MTTs and for the PRTs.
28 "All progress in Afghanistan…hinges on establishing a viable Afghan government" "Most Afghans do not view the insurgents as a viable alternative to the current government but are reluctant to stand up to them on behalf of a government that can neither protect them nor deliver basic services."" Kabul should take the initiative in fighting insurgents, building critical infrastructure, and reforming corrupt national institutions while provincial and district governments and community organizations should take the lead in driving local economies, delivering basic services, and conducting dispute resolution. Such synergy is critical to ingratiating the Afghan government to its citizens, thereby re-establishing its legitimacy."…actors should undertake efforts to invest in agriculture and build the infrastructure that will allow Afghan farmers to safely and securely transport their goods to market. Such action will create jobs, reduce Afghans' dependence on the drug trade, foster trade, and spur sustainable economic growth." "Long-term stability in Afghanistan-and the permanent eradication of terrorist bases on its soil-is attainable only if Afghan and international actors can agree e on a vision of an Afghanistan defined by good governance, economic growth and selfperpetuating security-and work together towards its attainment. Ali Ahmad Jalali, "How To Win In Afghanistan," Washington Times, March 1, 2009. 29 Heard from various Afghan military and political figures during OEF-VIII, referring to the time that the West, and that the enemy had to devote to the struggle in Afghanistan. Potential rivals, and friends, understand that the U.S. energy to devote to other Nations can be fleeting, despite our having been in this region for eight years. This particular quote was attributed to Mullah Omar according to Dr. Larry P. Goodson at the United States Army War College. 30 Quote from LTG Dave Barno:" One of the most positive aspects of the PRTs is that they allow the Afghan government to make its presence felt in the rural areas…focused on helping the people. "A PRT is really a catalyst. It forms a focal point in a particular area, with the goal of building not only relationships, but also serving as an accelerator in the rebuilding of the nation and extending the reach of the Afghan central government. th BCT, 10 th Mountain Division) and further developed it during the course of our rotation. COL Marty Schweitzer (commander, 4/82) capitalized on the great efforts of 3/10, and built on it due to our ability to put twice as many paratroopers on the ground in our portion of RC-East. This COIN effort included modifying our briefing for various congressional delegations and other distinguished visitors to enable them to clearly understand what we were doing in the COIN fight, and what was needed for us to be successful. In each "separating the enemy from the population"---was either done kinetically or non-kinetically. Our effort was to give enough "white space" to enable the Afghan government to provide the desired services to their people; this would give the average citizen the ability to "vote" on whether he would support the Islamic Government of Afghanistan, or choose the Taliban. Overwhelmingly in areas that we focused on, the Afghans chose to "build" with the IROA, instead of what was offered by the Taliban. 32 Spoken by COL Marty Schweitzer, Commander 4 th Brigade Combat Team, 82d Airborne Division 33 MAJ Basil Catanzaro joined our BCT after we arrived in country. A professional Civil Affairs officer, Catanzaro had just graduated from Naval Post Graduate School. Catanzaro had previously served as a CA officer in support of ARSOF in Afghanistan. Calm under pressure and absolutely unmatched in obtaining results for our BCT/PRT elements; led his very small team in this central piece of our COIN effort. The unsung heroes of this process were the very small Civil Military Operations element within the 4 th BCT headquarters; two dedicated officers and two NCOs who truly carried the water for the critical non-lethal CERP bullets 34 The COAB was briefing conducted in Bagram that attempted to show the metrics on how well we (the coalition) were doing in support of the Afghan government. Measures of performance and measures of effectiveness evolved throughout the duration of our deployment, and these measures were passed on to the units of the 101 st Airborne Division who relieved us. Previous rotations may have measured the number of schools built in an attempt to portray improvements in education, however we found that a building without a funded, trained teacher approved by the Minister of Education provided little to Afghan capacity building. Our internal COABs were prepared with information provided by both the maneuver battalions and our PRTs, with the commanders personally briefing the Brigade commander. This briefing matured over time, resulting in the PRT and maneuver commanders briefing along with their partnered Afghan provincial governors. The Afghan 203 rd Corps Commander, MG Khalique also participated along the security line of operation. 35 Again, this product was modified and improved under the talents of MAJ Catanzaro and SSG Chrystal Mixon of the BCT civil military operations cell. 36 Our divisional staff made what I consider to be a hasty decision on the road-way/weigh scale project. We had envisioned an Afghan road system that enabled the Afghan government to weigh the heavy vehicles coming across the border, and apply a regulated tariff on the traffic. This was to be a replacement for the random "taxes" levied by individual armed government/quasi governmental checkpoints throughout the country. The divisional staff opined that the Afghans needed to figure out their own system. I did not consider this a good method of assisting Afghan capacity building. Dr. Goodson provides the following: "Well-meaning or cynical decisions to "leave it to the locals" merely allow the preexisting problems to fester." Goodson, "Afghanistan's Road to Reconstruction",98.
37 I am confident that the training evolution for each PRT has improved on the last. Our second cycle of PRT commanders had been isolated at the Fort Bragg "Forward Operating Base" without access to either unclassified or classified electronic mail. Secure Videoteleconference capability from the Fort Bragg training site, to current PRT and BCT commanders in theater would greatly improve on the ability to share the best information with the incoming team. 38 We had an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) produced "PRT Handbook" while in Afghanistan. It was generally directed at "non U.S." PRTs in terms of its day to day utility but still provided a valuable lens to our commanders on how ISAF expected PRTs to operate. The Peace-keeping and stability operations institute at the United States Army War College provided me with a copy of the current PRT "playbook", although IRAQ grounded, it tracks with the Afghan experience. This quote provides insight into the value of PRTs in the COIN fight: "The PRT does not act as an alternative to a host nation's government but rather seeks to improve the governing capacity of the host nation. PRTs perform a vital role in occupying the vacuum caused by a weak government presence and hence deter agents of instability." U.S. Department of the Army, PRT Playbook Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, , (Washington, D.C.:U.S. Department of the Army, Center for Army Lessons Learned, September 2007).3 39 USAID documents illustrate that it will operate together with the DOD; to this end, they will require the funding and level of manning to make this happen. I saw the USAID expertise as valuable, but there were not enough of these dedicated professionals to have the optimal impact. USAID Civil Military Cooperation Policy states: "Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 (November 2005) indicates that stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the DOD shall be prepared to conduct and support." "The Directive acknowledges that many of the tasks and responsibilities associated with reconstruction and stabilization operations are not ones for which the military is necessarily best suited. However in the absence of civilian capacity to carry out these tasks, the capabilities will be developed within the military." "In unstable areas in which USAID frequently works, development and security are intertwined and interdependent. The absence of a stable and secure environment constrains the provision of development assistance, and without development assistance, security will remain unsustainable." " USAID is committed to a comprehensive, coherent whole of government approach and will partner with other USG entities to strengthen efforts to prepare, plan for, and conduct conflict mitigation, management, and stabilization assistance. United States Agency for International Development, Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy, (Washington, D.C.: United States Agency for International Development, July 2008) PD- ACL-777, http://www.usaid.gov/ our_work/global_partnerships/ma/documents/Civ-MilPolicyJuly282008.pdf (accessed February, 2009) . 40 "Outside of Afghanistan and the surrounding region, who cares whether Afghanistan falls apart? Why, from the point of view of the major powers, is the political failure of a marginal developing state a threat to regional security or world order? Should this phenomenon, even if the threat is fully realized, alter the existing national security doctrines or policies of great powers such as the United States? The answer to the last question is yes. Third World state failure is a threat to security-perhaps the most important security issue facing the world early in the twenty-first century. This is because the Hobbesian man is reemerging, and he is fighting with others over a range of issues and on a variety of issues and on a variety of battlefields that are untraditional…when terrorists strike anywhere, everywhere, against anyone, confident that a major force of integration(the international media, such as CNN) will cover it? Larry P. 41 The Human Terrain Teams and other experts working in Regional Command East helped map the economic activity within the provinces. One of the less advertised facts that the teams discovered (or re-discovered) was that although our provinces grew wheat, this wheat was exported to Pakistan for milling, with the flour re-exported to Afghanistan for purchase in the local markets. Afghan capacity for the full range of production requires improvement. During our rotation the funding of rock crushing machines and an Asphalt factory enabled Afghan firms to participate more fully in the road building business. Similarly, agricultural development projects, combined with road improvements, marketplace improvements, and solar lighting enabled Afghan farmers to more effectively participate in the local and regional economic process.
42 "In traditional Muslim societies, a senior male foreign government official might find it unacceptable to be advised by a foreign female advisor. He might tolerate it on the surface, but would be unlikely in the initial state to pay serious attention to her advice and might not be comfortable in her presence. The female advisor would find it difficult to accompany the official to many events, and being alone with him would be improper culturally. No matter how moral, professional, and correct she might be, an American female officer assigned such duties would have to overcome certain negative assumptions in foreign eyes. The female advisor may be able to overcome these cultural inhibitions against her success by force of personality and professional competence, but it will be a difficult uphill battle, consuming inordinate time and energy and possibly detracting from the advisory mission." Michael J. 
